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PROTECTION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
FROM PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
The rights of a defendant in a criminal case may be adversely af-
fected by the release to the public of prejudicial information con-
cerning him. In many instances, this information has been conveyed
to potential jurors by press, radio or television publicity prior to
the trial. A serious problem arises when a public prosecutor is re-
sponsible for the release of such information to public news media.
In the recent Fourth Circuit case, United States v. Milanovich' the
defendant was charged with larceny. Prior to the trial, the prosecutor
volunteered information to a local radio station concerning the
criminal record of the accused. At least three times during the week
preceding the trial, the radio station broadcast the statement that the
defendant "was a woman with a long record of arrests on charges of
prostitution and liquor sales."'2 On appeal from a conviction the de-
fendant claimed that the releasing of prejudicial information to pub-
lic news media concerning her criminal record constituted mis-
conduct warranting a reversal even though she conceded that no
actual prejudice existed among the jurors finally selected. 3 The
conviction was affirmed.
The government made no attempt to defend the conduct of its
prosecutor. Indeed, it conceded that such conduct violates the duties
and responsibilities of the office; however, no American authority
can be found holding a prosecutor accountable for such misconduct.
An important question relates to the sanctions that can be used
'3o3 F.2d 626 (4 th Cir. 1962).
2Id. at 629.
-The defendant relied upon Henslee v. United States, 246 F.2d 190 (5 th Cir.
1957), which held that where a prosecutor was responsible for the release of
prejudicial information concerning the defendant to public news media during
the trial, the defendant is entitled to a new trial as a matter of' course without
showing that the jury was exposed to such information and thereby actually
prejudiced. The case is distinguishable, however, in that some doubt existed as to
whether the jury was actually prejudiced. The judge upon learning of the publicity,
asked the jurors if anyone had read or heard any matter in the news connected
with the trial. There was no affirmative answer. On these facts the conviction for
misappropriation of public-funds was reversed.
In Milanovich, upon learning of the publicity, which occurred prior to the
trial, the court undertook a thorough voir dire examination of prospective juors.
Anyone who had heard the broadcasts was excused. Furthermore, the court offered
to continue the case or grant a change in venue but the defendant chose to proceed
to trial.
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against a prosecutor who refuses to recognize his duty to protect the
rights of those against whom he proceeds.4 Since the prosecutor is
an advocate he is not expected to be impartial.5 However, he is the
representative of the public, and is charged with the duty of protect-
ing the innocent as well as prosecuting the guilty.6 As the representa-
tive of the public, the prosecutor's statements carry great weight with
the people. This was recognized in 194o by the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association.7 While
acknowledging the duty of the Attorney General of the United States
to report to the people on the affairs of his office, the Committee
noted that any statement of fact he made would ordinarily be accepted
as true by the public. Consequently, the Committee said any asser-
tion of fact likely to create an adverse attitude in the public mind
regarding prospective or pending litigation should be omitted. It
follows that where similar statements are released by local court of-
ficers concerning actions pending within the locality, the acceptance
by the public is, though less in degree, similar in kind and effect.
The committee did not discuss the sanctions available for use
against the prosecutor who releases information injurious to the rights
of those brought to trial in the local courts. In the English case of Daw
v. Ely,8 an attorney was held in contempt of court for arguing the mer-
its of his client's pending case in the newspapers. As far as can be de-
termined, no attorney in the United States has been held in contempt
upon these grounds.
Subsection 1 of the federal contempt statute9 limits the scope of
summary contempt proceedings, triable without a jury, to cases of mis-
behavior in the presence of the court or "so near thereto as to ob-
'Mr. Justice Frankfurter in concurring with the majority in Irvin v. Dowd,
366 US. 717, 73o (1961), commented upon the frequency of such occurrences: "Not
a term passes without this court being importuned to review convictions, had in
states throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury
trial has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts-too often, as
in this case, with the prosecutor's collaboration."
1,DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925).
61Burger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)- "The United States Attorney
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win the case, but that justice shall be done."
Canon 5, Canons of Professional Ethics, says: "The primary duty of a lawyer
engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done."
"Opinion 199, Jan. 194o, 26 A.B.A.J. 233 (1940).
8L.R. 7 Eq. 49 (1868).
918 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1947).
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struct the administration of justice."10 The United States Supreme
Court in Nye v. United States," reversing its earlier position,12 con-
strued the words "so near as requiring that the contemptuous act
must occur in physical proximity to the court.'3
The act also provides in subsection 2 that the court's summary
power to punish for contempt extends to cases of misbehavior of an)
of its officers in their official transactions. This power is not limited
to occurrences in or near the physical presence of the court. The early
cases construed "officer of the court" to include the misconduct of
an attorney.' 4 However, the United States Supreme Court in Cammer
v. United States,'5 in reversing an attorney's conviction for contempt,
held that an attorney was not an officer of the court within the mean-
ing of the section.16 In reaching this conclusion, the Court indicated
that to bring an attorney within the summary contempt provision
might, at times, result in narrowing the protection a client expects
from his counsel.17 Although not called upon to determine the issue
in Cammer, the Court indicated that it would be hard to draw any
line of distinction between official and unofficial transactions. The
Court accepted as plausible the contention that, if any attorney were
considered an "officer of the court" in his private practice, then he
would be "engaged in official transactions whenever engaged in the
practice of his profession."' 8
Thus, a distinction can be drawn between an attorney in private
practice and a public prosecutor since the prosecutor's duties are
couched in terms of protecting the public interest.19 The courts have
10Ibid.
U313 U.S. 33 (1941).
"In the relatively early case of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247
U.S. 402 (1918), this section was construed by the United States Supreme Court to
mean that "so near" as therein used, does not require that the contemptuous
conduct occur in geographical proximity to the court proceedings, but that it is
sufficient if the act has a direct tendency to obstruct the administration of justice.
1313 US. at 52.
"Ex parte Davis, 122 Fed. 139 (C.C.D. Fla. i9a).
"5350 U.S. 399 (1956).
"Id. at 405.
"TId. at 406-G7. Further, the petitioner offered convincing arguments that his
conduct did not constitute "misbehavior" but was a "good faith attempt to discharge
his duties as counsel for a defendant in a criminal case." 350 U.S. at 404.
1Id. at 404.
"'The court did state, however, that in the Nye case (see note ii supra), it had
reviewed the legislative history of the Contempt Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487
(1831), the forerunner of the present federal contempt statute, and had found that
the purpose of the act was to limit the summary contempt power of federal courts.
Thus, a narrow construction has been given to the present act.
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consistently recognized this distinction by noting the "quasi-judicial"
quality of the prosecutor's office. 20 Following this line of reasoning,
the Supreme Court of Indiana held that a prosecutor was an officer of
the court, and that it was the duty of the court to insure his proper
conduct.2 1 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc. v. State22 asserted that the courts still have the tra-
ditional power to discipline officials who are a part of the administra-
tion of justice. Thus, under the federal contempt statute and similar
state statutes,23 a prosecutor releasing prejudicial information to the
public could be held to answer for his misconduct. The fact remains
that such powers have not been exercised.
In 1892, William S. Forrest, a member of the Chicago Bar, said
that the only workable solution to this and other comparable problems
was the exercise of self control by the legal profession. 24 Accepting
this idea, the American Bar Association, in 19o8, adopted the Canons
of Professional Ethics, of which Canon 20 on "Newspaper Discussion
of Pending Litigation" provides that newpspaper publication by a
lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation is to be condemned.25
For the most part, Canon 2o has been ignored, being considered too
general to accomplish its desired result. In a survey, conducted under
the auspices of the American Bar Association, 26 judges, lawyers and
21State ex rel. Griffith v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235 258 S.W.2d 59° (1953); State ex
rel. Poter v. District Court First Judicial Dist., 124 Mont. 249, 220 P.2d 1035 (1950);
People v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 281 (1948).
2 Lake County Property Owner's Ass'n v. Hqlovacka, 233 Ind. 509, 12o N.E.2d
263 (1954).
22193 Md. 3oo, 67 A.2d 477 (1949).
inMd. Ann. Code art. 26 § 4 (1957); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:1o-i (1952); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17 § 2041 (1952).
Rule 904 of the Rules of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City expressly rec-
ognizes the power of the courts to punish a state's attorney for issuance of any
statement relative to the issues of a pending criminal action. See Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc. v. State, note 22 supra.
2'Foster, Trial By Newspaper, 14 Crim. Law. Mag. 550 (1892).
'Canon 2o, Canons of Professional Ethics says: "Newspaper publication by a
lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the
Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they
are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a
statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte
reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records or papers
on file in the court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte
statement."
-"Phillips & McCoy, Conduct of Judges and Lawyers 161-87 (1952). For several
years prior to publishing this book, the council of the Survey of the Legal Profession
under the American Bar Asociation made extensive inquiries throughout the
United States concerning matters affecting the administration of justice. Many of
the results of these inquiries were included in the above titled chapter.
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newspaper editors were asked to comment upon the desirability of
enforcing Canon 2o. While they pointed out many difficulties in-
volved in its enforcement, those replying were almost unanimously
in favor of upholding the Canon.2 7 Therefore, it is submitted that
Canon 20 should be revised in order to state more definitely the prin-
ciple on which the Canon is based.
The major problem that arises in adhering to the Canon is oc-
casioned when a pending prosecution is of the nature likely to create
great public interest. The attorneys are met by demands from the
press to make statements concerning the case. The press asserts that it
is merely meeting the demands of the public. The problem is further
complicated by the acceptance of the premise that the guarantee of
a public trial under the sixth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, besides the inherent protection afforded the defendant,
also vests certain qualified rights in the public so that the people may
keep abreast of the conduct of the public's business.2 8 The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in Cowley v. Pulsifer 9 said "[I]t is of the high-
est moment that those who administer justice should always act under
the sense of public responsibility.... ."30
The United States Supreme Court has thus far refused to ad-
judicate the delicate issues involved in resolving the conflict between
the rights of the press to supply the public with sensational publicity
concerning the details of actions pending in the courts and the rights
of the defendant to a fair trial by an impartial jury.3 1 Thus, in the
instance where there has been publicity surrounding a criminal trial
the defendant must rely on the standard established by the United
States Supreme Court in the leading case of Irvin v. Dowd32 to de-
termine the impartiality of a juror. The court said there that the
mere existence of a preconceived notion as to the innocence or guilt
of an accused was insufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospec-
tive jurior's impartiality. 33 The defendant must show that the pub-
licity has been so extensive and prejudicial that the court cannot
reasonably accept the statements of jurors who assert that their pre-
2id. at 161.
2See Comment, 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 199 (1956).
2"137 Mass. 392 (1884).
'1Id. at 394.
-Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919-20 (195o).
1366 U.S. 717 (1961).
"Id. at 722-23.
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judices can be cast off.34 Acting under this standard, the determina-
tion of whether or not a fair trial has been held rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court.
35
Under this system, it can seldom be ascertained with certainty
that the constitutional rights of the accused have been upheld. The
Supreme Court of California in People v. Stroble36 recognized this
when it said that: "the bias of jurors who have been exposed to re-
peated sensational publicity concerning a case is likely to be un-
conscious; they may honestly disclaim bias and yet have unknowingly
prejudged in the case." 37 In this case, as in Milanovich, the prosecutor
was the instigator in releasing publicity concerning the defendant. It
has been shown that by this misconduct the prosecutor may expose
the defendant to undetected bias, prejudicing the jury against him.
This misconduct should not go unrestrained.38
Where a prosecutor is guilty of extreme or repeated misconduct
of this nature, disbarment proceedings are available. But they should
not be undertaken if any less severe punishment will accomplish the
desired end.39 It is submitted that contempt proceedings are available
and that they should be instituted in cases where a prosecutor refuses
to accept the duties and responsibilities attending his public office.
J. R. CANTERBURY
""[The] findings of impartiality should be set aside only .where prejudice is
'manifest'." 366 U.S. at 724. See also, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156
(1878).
3 Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. f96o), Thistle v. People, 119
Colo. 1, 199 P.2d 642 (1949); People v. Mangano, 354 11. 329, 188 N.E. 475 (1933);
Commonwealth v. Valverdi, 218 Pa. 7, 66 AtI. 877 (1907).
"The trial judge has a large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice
resulting from the reading by jurors of news articles concerning the trial . . .Gen-
eralizations beyond that statement are not profitable, because each case must turn on
its special facts." Marshall v. United States, 36o U.S. 310, 312 (1959).
336 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951).
"Id. at 334.
wThe results obtained from the survey of the legal profession discussed, supra
note 26, with but two exceptions, showed affirmative answers to the question:
"Would it be in the public interest for courts to punish lawyers who violate
Canon 2o for contempt of court when, in the opinion of the judge, such violation
constitutes a clear and present danger that the litigant in a civil or criminal action
may be deprived of a fair trial by due process of law?" McCoy & Phillips, Conduct
of Judges and Lawyers, 173 (1952).
" The [disbarment] proceeding is not for the purpose of punishment, but for
the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them." Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882).
